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Abstract
How does regionalization affect national social policies? Although there is an extensive literature on the effects of
globalization on social protection, the literature on the impact of regional integration is much less developed. I argue that
the distinctive nature of regionalization processes calls for rigorous empirical testing of the domestic policy effects of
regional integration. To this end, using an innovative dataset that measures the degree to which countries are integrated
into regional economic and political organizations, this article uses statistical analysis to consider the influence of regional
integration on government social spending. The results are surprising: regionalization has a significant and positive
relationship with government social spending, controlling for other factors, even when the European Union countries
are excluded from the analysis. In fact, in the EU countries increasing regionalization is associated with lower social
spending levels. These results suggest that regional economic and political integration does not necessarily lead to a
“race to the bottom” of social spending. Instead, regionalization appears to accommodate wide divergence in national
social policy commitments.
Keywords
Globalization, race to the bottom, regional integration, regionalization, social policy

Introduction
How does regional integration affect national social policies? Despite extensive literature on globalization’s effects
on social spending, and despite dramatic growth in the
number of regional organizations and the intra-regional
movement of goods, capital, and labor, the literature investigating regional integration’s impact on social policies is
comparatively underdeveloped. Furthermore, given that
most international trade is regionalized, rather than globalized, some scholars argue that regional integration’s
effect on national policies may be stronger than the effect
of globalization (Beckfield, 2006).1
This article presents an empirical analysis indicating
that increasing regional integration is associated with
increased levels of social spending. Its findings show that
as states integrate into regional political and economic
institutions, they do not necessarily face a “race to the bottom” in social spending in which governments compete to
cut spending—and the tax burden on domestic firms—in
order to attract foreign firms and prevent domestic firms
from relocating to neighboring states where it is cheaper to
do business. Instead, I find that in most states, regional

integration is associated with higher levels of social spending. The research makes several contributions. First, it
contributes to the nascent literature on social policies in
the developing world.2 Second, it applies well-developed
and oft-tested theories about the domestic effects of international economic pressures to cases outside of the OECD
context. Scholars writing in the “race to the bottom”/
“climb to the top” school either have assumed these theories would not hold or have neglected to test these theories
beyond OECD states. Finally, I employ an innovative
measure of regional integration developed at the regional
level of analysis by other researchers (Efird and Genna,
2002), applying it to individual countries from 1980–2000,
a period of time that captures important changes in levels
of regional integration all over the globe.
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Figure 1. Levels of regional integration.

Figure 2. Social spending as a percentage of total government
expenditures.

Regionalization, globalization, and
social spending
Regional integration refers to the process of increasing
political and economic cooperation among states in close
geographic proximity to each other.3 Scholars often conceptualize regional integration as two broadly conceived processes: economic integration and political integration.
Economic integration, they argue, is a more informal, societally-driven process that removes trade and investment barriers (Haggard, 1993; Katzenstein, 2005). This type of
integration has been occurring at significant levels around
the world. Political integration is a more top-down, statedriven process of institutional creation at the regional level
(Fawcett, 2004; Katzenstein, 2005). Marchand et al. (1999)
conceive of political integration as a policy project motivated by interests, but also by identity and ideological factors. Political integration, including the creation of regional
political institutions, is a process that has developed much
more slowly outside of Europe, although recent developments in Southeast Asia and South America suggest renewed
efforts on this score (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Jetschke,
2010). Over the last few decades, the degree of integration
that regional trading organizations have actually implemented has increased substantially (Efird and Genna, 2002;
Haftel 2007). Figure 1 demonstrates these trends.
Regional integration is contested because, like globalization, it creates national policy externalities as labor and capital mobility increase. Certainly, regional integration is related
to the larger process of globalization. It is, however, a distinct
form of international embeddedness that differs from globalization in several important ways. Regional integration
can place different demands on governments than globalization processes more generally because it can be more strongly
institutionalized, can generate higher cross-border flows, and
can take on elements of political integration or supranationalism that are absent from the anarchic global level.
Economically, states may pursue regional integration
in order to achieve fuller liberalization than they would
be able to achieve under multilateral trading agreements
(Lawrence, 1996). With greater capital mobility within
the region, states may have an incentive to cut social

programs and corporate tax rates in order to make their
economies more attractive to businesses. Social dumping
and migration to member states with more generous social
policies can also put strain on those welfare states. Beyond
economic pressures, regional integration includes a political dimension that exists to a much lesser degree at the
global level. Regionalization is more highly institutionalized than globalization and it can lead member states to
pursue certain policies in a way that most global organizations, including the World Trade Organization, are unable
to do (Beckfield, 2006). For example, Pierson (1996)
argues that, in the EU member states, national political
actors can pursue welfare state retrenchment more successfully than they could prior to EU membership because
they can blame their cuts on the EU and suffer less political backlash from voters.
On the other hand, regional integration could have positive social outcomes if states compensate society for economic insecurity with increased social spending, or if social
policies are created or protected at the supranational level.
Caporaso and Tarrow (2009) argue that this is exactly what
has happened in the EU. Examining the implications of the
free movement of labor in the EU on national social policy
frameworks, they contend that the European Court of
Justice has actively promoted the protection of social rights
at the regional level (though they did not look at spending).
Finally, regional integration may have no effect on social
policies, allowing for continued divergence in these policies cross-nationally.
How has social spending changed over the past few
decades, and how can we link these changes to globalization or regionalization processes? Missing data is a significant problem for assessing spending trends in
non-OECD countries. The data on spending across the
developing world is extremely sparse, so we should be
very cautious when drawing conclusions from the data
that is available. The graph in Figure 2 presents spending
averages in OECD and non-OECD countries over the last
few decades; the trend for non-OECD countries especially
should be interpreted carefully, given the problems with
missing data.4
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Theoretical perspectives
Existing theories of both globalization and regionalization
can shed light on the ways regional integration may affect
national social policy spending. “Race to the bottom” or
convergence approaches would expect regionalization to
exacerbate the economic pressures placed on states by
greater economic interdependence and globalization.
Scholars argue that the pressures to be competitive in global
markets reduce national policy autonomy in areas ranging
from social policy to fiscal policy to monetary policy
(Cerny, 1995; Rodrik, 1998). Some analysts argue that the
“race to the bottom” effect is most likely to operate on
developing countries (Rudra, 2002). If increasing market
integration pressures governments to adopt similar policies,
we should expect the integration of regional markets, which
is often deeper than integration achieved by global institutions like the WTO, to heighten these pressures. Regional
integration could lead to cuts in social spending as countries within regional organizations compete to attract (or
keep) capital. By reducing expenditures, governments may
be able to lower corporate tax rates, making their country a
more attractive place to do business. The “race to the bottom” hypothesis suggests that as regional integration
increases, especially in terms of trade and capital openness,
social spending is likely to decrease.
Other scholars argue that the insecurities imposed on social
groups by global competition fuel demands for states to
increase social spending. These demands produced the postWWII expansion of the welfare state in most of the advanced
capitalist democracies (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985).
Under conditions of regionalization, this welfare state expansion can be viewed as a way for governments to compensate
workers for the stronger wage competition of the regional
market’s larger labor pool. The compensation hypothesis suggests that as regional integration increases, social spending is
also likely to increase.
Finally, the null hypothesis is that regional integration is
not related to changes in national social spending. If we do
observe cuts or growth in social policy among members of
regional trading agreements, these changes will be the result
of other processes, such as globalization or domestic changes.
Many argue that changes in welfare state spending are primarily the result of domestic processes such as deindustrialization or demographic changes rather than international-level
processes such as globalization or regionalization (Huber
and Stevens, 2001; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Mosley 2003).
I test some of these domestic-level variables in this study.

Variables, data, and methodology
In this study, I use time-series cross-sectional panel data for
all possible countries, from 1980–2000, the years for which
the most data is available. Despite the significant problems
with missing data for non-OECD countries on several

variables, including my dependent variable, a major purpose
of this study is to understand the effects of regionalization in
a wider comparative context that goes beyond the EU and
other OECD countries. Because of sparse data from the
developing world, however, results should be interpreted
cautiously.
The unit of analysis in this study is the country-year. The
dependent variable is social welfare spending. I measure
this as the ratio of social welfare spending to total government expenditures.5 This measure may better capture government spending priorities than does a measure of social
spending as a percentage of GDP (Wibbels and Ahlquist,
2011a: 138). Social welfare expenditures, as defined by the
IMF measure, include government spending for welfare
purposes, including pension and retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, sickness and old age benefits, and family allowances. I draw data for this variable from Wibbels
and Ahlquist (2011b), whose data is sourced from IMF
Government Finance Statistics, the Economic Commission
of Latin America (CEPAL), and from their own primary
data collection efforts.
The key independent variable is level of regional integration. To measure the extent to which a country has integrated into a regional body, I use Efird and Genna’s (2002)
Integration Achievement Score (IAS). Efird and Genna
developed this multi-dimensional measure from original
data on the levels of regional integration actually achieved
in all cases of regional integration reported to the WTO, up
until 2004. They assign each organization an IAS score for
each year that the organization has been in existence. Their
coding system looks at six categories of regional economic
and political integration—trade, capital mobility, labor
mobility, supranational institutionalization, monetary policy coordination, and fiscal policy coordination—and gives
each regional organization a score between zero and five
for each category. Each organization’s IAS score is the
average of the levels of integration achieved in each category. The coding system is described in full detail in the
appendices at the end of this article. The IAS measure is
one of only a small handful of attempts to code regions
according to the level of integration that is actually implemented.6 In this way, this measure should allow us to
advance studies of regionalization and empirically test theories of regionalization’s causes and effects.
In this study I have applied this measure of regional integration to the country level of analysis, although Efird and
Genna devised the measure with the region as the unit of
analysis. For example, they measured the level of regionalization achieved by Mercosur for each year of Mercosur’s
existence. Because I am interested in the domestic effects of
individual countries’ levels of integration into regional
frameworks, my unit of analysis is the country-year. I have
thus coded each member state of a regional organization with
the IAS score that the organization achieved in that year. A
potential problem with this application of the IAS score is
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Table 1. Social spending as a percentage of total government expenditures.

IAS score
Trade openness
FDI openness
GDP per capita (ln)
Polity
Population > 65 years
Service sector employment
EU dummy
Constant
Number of observations

Model 1
(All countries)
Time-series
fixed-effects

Model 2
(Non-EU countries)
Time-series
fixed-effects

Model 3
(EU countries only)
Time-series
fixed-effects

1.872***
(0.542)
−0.014
(0.015)
0.011
(0.015)
3.303***
(0.691)
0.002
(0.072)
−0.830
(0.498)
−0.014
(.036)
−10.243***
(1.413)
5.037
(5.005)
528

1.638***
(0.557)
−0.023
(0.015)
−0.059***
(0.021)
1.415
(0.812)
−0.033
(0.067)
3.069***
(0.727)
−0.044
(0.033)

−2.048**
(0.822)
0.006
(0.056)
0.023
(0.022)
4.169***
(1.429)

−9.445
(5.342)
346

27.353***
(11.228)
182

−2.960***
(0.801)
0.277
(0.191)

*p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

that there may be significant variation in the degree to which
member states of the same organization implement agreedupon integration measures. There may also be significant
cases of noncompliance. To address this, I have adjusted
each country’s IAS score in a given year to take into account
any formal ways it opted out of deeper integration that other
member states of the organization pursued. For example, the
EU countries that have opted out of the single currency
receive a lower score than those that have adopted the euro.
While this partially addresses the issue of variation in regionalization among members of the same organization, this
measure cannot account for informal ways that individual
member states may obstruct regional integration.
Finally, I limited the cases of regional integration in this
study to multilateral organizations that have achieved at
least a free trade area: the EU, Mercosur, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA), the Central American Common Market
(CACM), the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), and the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). I did not include
members of regional organizations in Africa or the Middle
East in this analysis because of severe missing data problems for my dependent variable. I assigned countries a
score of zero in all years prior to joining a regional organization. When a country was a member of more than one
regional body, I assigned it the higher of the two scores.
I have included several variables in my model to control
for other commonly theorized determinants of social welfare

spending. First, it is important to attempt to distinguish
between regionalization and globalization effects, though
these certainly overlap. To control for the influence of globalization, I control for trade openness, measured as the
total number of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP
(“World Development Indicators,” World Bank), and for
FDI (foreign direct investment) openness, measured as the
total stocks of inward plus outward FDI as a percentage of
GDP (“UNCTADStat,” United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development). Second, I control for several
domestic-level variables that have been theorized to affect
social spending levels. I control for GDP per capita, the percentage of the population that is over 65 years old, the percentage of the population working in the service sector (all
drawn from the World Development Indicators), and the
strength of democracy (from the Polity IV score, Marshall
et al., 2004). These domestic variables test arguments that
higher levels of development, democracy, deindustrialization, and population ageing should put upward pressure on
governments’ levels of social spending.7 Finally, I control
for EU membership in order to ensure that the “European
model” of generous national welfare states under high levels
of regional integration does not bias the results of my
broader cross-national model.
I estimate the effects of regional integration on social
spending for the time period of 1980–2000. With crossnational data that spans such a broad swath of countries,
there are many country-specific factors that could influence social spending levels. In order to account for these
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country-specific factors, and for omitted variable bias, I
estimate the model as a time-series with country fixedeffects. While my baseline model includes all countries, I
run an additional model that excludes EU countries, as well
as a third model consisting of only EU countries. Given the
emphasis in the literature on the “uniqueness” of the EU
model of high social spending combined with high regionalization, it is important to ensure these countries do not
bias the results of the broader cross-national models.

Results
In Table 1, for the full sample of countries (Model 1), regional
integration has a significant and positive effect on social spending, suggesting that in a given country, as integration increases
over time, social spending as a percentage of total government
expenditures increases as well. Substantively, a one-point
increase in a country’s IAS score is associated with a 1.9%
increase in social spending as a percentage of total government
expenditures. The only other independent variables that reach
statistical significance in this model are GDP per capita and the
dummy variable controlling for EU membership. Higher levels
of economic development are likely associated with higher
social spending because as economies develop, domestic social
groups become better mobilized and acquire more resources to
lobby governments successfully for welfare benefits.
The results of the full model suggest that, as countries
become more integrated into regional economic and political structures, they will not necessarily face economic pressures that force cuts in social welfare spending. In fact,
countries that are more economically open and politically
integrated within their region tend to spend more on social
welfare. But considering that that level of development and
EU membership are the only other two independent variables that predict social spending at a statistically significant
level, we might reasonably wonder if the highly integrated
EU states are driving these results.
To address this concern, Model 2 (Table 1) employs a
time-series fixed-effects analysis on a sample that excludes
EU countries. In case the effects of EU candidacy may also
bias the results, I also excluded states that would become EU
members in the future. The results of Model 2 again indicate
that as a country becomes more regionally integrated over
time, its social welfare expenditures are likely to increase as
well, even after controlling for the effects of increased global
integration (captured by the trade and FDI openness variables) and for domestic demographic and structural factors.
The exclusion of the EU countries increases confidence in
the general applicability of this relationship.
Two other variables are statistically significant in this
model: FDI openness and size of the elderly population. FDI
openness has a negative effect on social spending, though its
effects are substantively very small. Countries with substantial levels of foreign investment may be pressured to keep
corporate taxes low, and this may constrain government social

expenditures. Not surprisingly, having a large population that
is over 65 years old is positively and significantly associated
with social spending. The relatively large size of this coefficient gives some support to arguments that domestic demographic have a greater influence on social spending levels
than international factors (Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Pierson,
2001).
Finally, I estimated the effects of increased regional integration on the EU member states only. Again using timeseries fixed-effects, the results were surprising. I found that
increasing levels of integration over time are associated with
lower welfare spending as a percentage of total expenditures
in these states. This finding is the opposite of what I found in
the full sample as well as in the sample consisting of only
non-EU countries. This finding suggests that in EU countries
where social expenditures already make up a significant percentage of government expenditures, openness to the welldeveloped and highly competitive European markets does
constrain social spending. The fact that neither openness to
trade nor FDI are significant suggests that there is something
specific about integrating into EU structures, rather than
global structures, that constrains social spending. This could
be related to monetary integration in the EU, to the constraints
on national fiscal policy imposed by the Maastricht criteria,
and to the limits on member states’ public debts and deficits.
The democracy variable is excluded from this model, as slowmoving institutional variables tend to be highly collinear with
country fixed-effects, and there is extremely little variation on
the Polity score for the EU sample in this time period. There
is also little variation in the percentage of the population over
age 65 in this model, so the large, negative, and significant
coefficient on that variable may not be reliable.
Interestingly, trade openness is not significantly related
to social spending in any of the models, nor does its coefficient have a substantial size. Social expenditures are better predicted by the degree to which countries are more
broadly integrated into economic and political institutions
in their region. Trade is certainly a component of this
regional integration, but other dimensions of regionalization, such as greater labor mobility, may counterbalance
potential “race to the bottom” competitive pressures.
As a robustness check, I estimated the three above models using an alternative indicator of regional integration
developed by Haftel (2007) that combines measures of the
scope of institutionalization and implementation of regional
integration agreements. This measure was coded at fiveyear intervals, so there are considerably fewer data points.
With the exception of the final EU-only model (Model 3,
Table 1), for which there are too few observations for a
meaningful analysis (n=24), the other two models (Models
1 and 2) generate similar results to those reported above.
Level of regional integration is positive and significantly
associated with social spending, even when controlling for
other leading explanations in the international political
economy literature.
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Discussion and conclusions
This study uses one of a very few existing datasets on the
implementation of regional integration to probe an understudied question, and it yields some interesting and unexpected
results that provoke further analysis. Overall, the results of this
study are consistent with theories of globalization or regional
integration that predict continued divergence of national social
spending levels. The results of my country fixed-effects models show that greater regionalization is associated with higher
levels of social spending in the broad cross-national sample.
However, a surprising finding was that this is not the case in
the EU countries. Here, social spending decreased as regional
integration increased, suggesting that regionalization does
constrain social spending either when levels of integration are
very high, or when social spending commitments are very
high. The potential interaction between level of development
and regionalization should be further explored.
Despite limitations introduced by missing data, especially for developing countries, this study is a first step in
assessing how regionalization affects national social policy
commitments outside of the EU. It is important to emphasize that the central finding that regionalization is associated
with higher social policy spending in the broader comparative context, even when controlling for other international
and domestic-level factors, should be carefully interpreted.
The results here are supportive of the divergence hypothesis, rather than the convergence or “race to the bottom”
hypotheses. I do not argue that regional integration causes
governments to increase social spending. Yet, it is clear
from this study that most countries that integrate into
regional economic and political organizations will not be
forced to reduce social spending as a percentage of government expenditures. Indeed, greater national commitments to
social welfare often occur alongside regional integration.
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Notes
1.

2.
3.

Lawrence (1996) demonstrated that the growth of trade
within regional trading blocs is far greater than the growth
of trade between different trading blocs or between blocs and
the rest of the world.
See Avelino et al., 2005; Rudra, 2002; Wibbels, 2006; and
Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011a as other notable examples.
Space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of the
causes and dimensions of regional integration. For a more

4.

5.
6.
7.

in-depth overview of regional integration from a comparative perspective, see Madeira and Caporaso (2011).
To calculate spending averages across the developing world I
did not impute missing data as others have done (see Rudra,
2002) because there are serious methodological concerns with
this procedure. The trends above are based on 1,492 observations between 1972 and 1999 for all non-OECD countries.
This is the measurement employed by Rudra (2002) and
Wibbels and Ahlquist (2011a).
Haftel (2007) provides an alternative measure.
See Adserà and Boix, 2002; Brown and Hunter, 1999; Iversen
and Cusack, 2000.
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Appendix A:
Integration achievement score (Efird and Genna, 2002)
Variable

Value range

Description

G&S
Cap
Lab
SI
MC
FC
EIAS

0 to 5
0 to 5
0 to 5
0 to 5
0 to 5
0 to 5
0 to 5

PIAS

0 to 5

IAS

0 to 5

Free movement of goods and services
Free movement of capital
Free movement of labor
Supranational institutions
Monetary coordination
Fiscal coordination
Economic integration achievement score
Average of G&S, Cap, and Lab
Political integration achievement score
Average of SI, MC, and FC
Integration achievement score
Average of G&S, Cap, Lab, SI, MC, and FC

Each abbreviation is defined in the description column.

Appendix B:
IAS coding system (Efird and Genna, 2002)
1. Trade in goods and services
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers
1 = Preferential tariff agreement
2 = Partial free trade area
3 = Full free trade area
4 = Customs union (common external tariffs)
5 = No barriers among member countries
2. Degree of capital mobility
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility
1 = Foreign direct investment allowed in limited form
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government procurement
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large-scale mergers and acquisitions
(Continued)
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Appendix B. (Continued)
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction
3. Degree of labor mobility
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions
2 = Full right of movement
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices
5 = Full freedom of movement
4. Level of supranational institution importance
0 = No supranational institutions
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions
2 = Information gathering and advisory role
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node
5. Degree of monetary policy coordination
0 = No monetary policy coordination
1 = Consultation regarding policy
2 = Commitment to maintain parity
3 = Coordinated interventions
4 = Regional central bank establishment
5 = Single currency
6. Degree of fiscal policy coordination
0 = No fiscal policy coordination
1 = Consultation regarding policy
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments
4 = Uniform tax code
5 = Single budget

Appendix C:
Detailed source information on variables in dataset
1) DV: Social expenditures as a percentage of government expenditures
From Wibbels E and Ahlquist JS, “Replication data for: ‘Trade, Development, and Social Insurance’ International Studies
Quarterly 2011”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15466 V3 [Version].
2) Regional integration (primary measure)
From the Integration Achievement Scores Dataset, Version 4.0 (5/2010). Described in Efird B and Genna GM (2002)
Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration. European Union Politics 3(3): 267–295.
In this dataset, regional organizations are the unit of analysis. As described in the main article, I applied this measure
at the country level and recoded where necessary to reflect country-level variation in integration, among members of the
same organization. I used information available on the websites of the regional organizations about opt-outs and special
exemptions for various members to identify these country-level differences in integration among members of the same
organization.
3) Regional integration (secondary measure used as robustness check)
From Haftel dataset described in Haftel YZ (2007) Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements institutional
variation, and militarized interstate disputes. International Organization 61(1): 217–237.
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4) Trade openness

Measured as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, constructed from import and export flow data from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators database, various years.
5) FDI openness
Measured as the total stocks of inward plus outward FDI as a percentage of GDP, constructed using FDI data from
UNCTADStat, various years.
6) GDP per capita, current US dollars
World Development Indicators, various years.
7)

GDP, current US dollars

World Development Indicators, various years.
8) Percentage of population over 65 years old
World Development Indicators, various years.
9) Democracy measure
Measured using the Polity IV indicator from Marshall MG, Jaggers K, Gurr T (2004) Polity IV. College Park, MD:
University of Maryland. Dataset available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html
10) Percentage of population employed in service sector
World Development Indicators, various years.
11) Membership in EU or candidate for EU membership
Author’s own coding using information about membership on the EU’s website http://europa.eu/index_en.htm
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